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STUDIES AND ARTICLES
The proliferation and advancement of technology, es-pecially the use of the internet and mobile phones, is 
leading to fundamental changes in how companies interact 
with customers. Technology and the widespread usage of 
internet have gradually changed the design and delivery 
of several banking services. Internet and mobile banking 
has become the self-service delivery channel that allows 
banks to provide information and offer services to their 
customers with more convenience. At the same time, the 
ubiquity of the internet and new information technologies 
have lowered the barrier of entering the finance indust-
ry by reducing the initial investment and the transaction 
costs.
These changes have fueled the entrance of new type 
of financial intermediaries, Fintechs in the financial sec-
tor. The common characteristics of these new entrants that 
they adopted an internet-only strategy having little or even 
no branch system and relying on other networks – mainly 
internet and mobile – to meet the majority of customers’ 
transaction and financial needs. The rise of new inter-
net-based players is a global trend, reaching developed 
and developing economies alike. 
The question arises whether do Fintechs have the po-
tential to compete with, or replace them in the financial 
intermediation. This study aims to discuss the role of these 
new entrants in the financial market in the context of the 
financial intermediation literature. The paper focuses on 
two segments of the Fintech sector: online marketplace 
lenders and neo-banks. While online marketplace lenders 
aiming to disintermediate traditional banks in credit pro-
cess, neo-are banks providing deposit services for custom-
ers in a low-cost operating model. Both types of entrants 
claim to bring ambitions changes for the financial indus-
try: to ‘disrupt’ long-established traditional commercial 
banking business models. Although these players have 
gained significant media attention recently, the academ-
ic literature to understand the role and operation of these 
players is limited. 
The main question the paper is addressing is what role 
online marketplace lenders and neo-banks are playing in 
the economy from a financial intermediation theory per-
spective. Are these players disintermediating commercial 
banks or do they play a rather supplementary role in the 
financial intermediation? 
The structure of this paper is the following: First, it 
introduces the foundations of the literature of financial 
intermediation theory and reflects on the implications of 
technology and Fintech innovation on the financial in-
termediation. The main purpose of the chapter is to get 
an understanding what the fundamental role of banks in 
the economy is.  In the second section, the paper infers 
the key differentiating factors with respect to the function 
of banks versus other financial intermediaries. In the last 
section, the paper assesses whether the reduction of trans-
action costs and information asymmetries caused by the 
development of information technologies create opportu-
nity for new type of financial intermediaries and business 
models. The question addressed by this section is wheth-
er online marketplace lenders and neo-banks are able to 
compete with banks and potentially replace them or are 
they rather complementary to the existing financial inter-
mediation activity of traditional banks.
The role of banks and the implication of 
technology
This section focuses on to summarize the core literature 
on the existence of financial intermediaries. It is claimed 
that banks exist to solve or reduce market imperfections, 
such as: differences in the preferences of lenders and bor-
rowers (in terms of size, maturity, liquidity, risk), presence 
of transaction costs, shocks in consumers’ consumption 
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and asymmetric information (which gives rise to both 
adverse selection and moral hazard). Standard textbooks 
explain banks as an institution that core operations con-
sist of granting loans by deposits from the public (Ro-
chet – Freixas, 2008; Greenbaum – Thakor, 2007). This 
definition refers to the core activity of commercial banks, 
namely the simultaneous acceptance of deposits and offer-
ing of loans, which distinguishes them from other finan-
cial intermediaries. However, banks typically conduct a 
broader range of activities, which can be subsumed under 
the following three functions: provide funding liquidity, 
transform assets, and ameliorate the information problem 
between investors and borrowers. 
By introducing the core literature around these func-
tions, the paper discussed what makes banks ‘special’ ver-
sus other entities of the economy. The section also high-
lights implications of technology and Fintech innovations 
to the role of banks in the financial intermediation. 
Banks as liquidity providers
The role of banks as liquidity providers has been studies 
by a large literature suggesting that one of the reasons for 
banks existence is to supply liquidity to borrowers and 
lenders (Diamond – Dybving, 1986; Gorton – Pennac-
chi, 1990; Lewis, 1992; Rajan, 1996; Holmström – Tirole, 
1998; Kashyap et al., 2002; Gatev – Strahan, 2006; Dia-
mond, 2007; Tirole et al., 2010).
Diamond and Dybvig (1986) suggest that an im-
portant role of banks is to create liquidity, thus banks 
fulfill valuable activities on both sides of their balance 
sheets by granting loans to borrowers and providing li-
quidity on demand to depositors. Banks usually fulfill 
their liquidity provision function by granting long-term 
and illiquid loans to borrowers by using short-term 
and liquid deposits. By offering these services jointly, 
banks can provide liquidity services to customers and 
investors who are uncertain about the timing of their 
future consumption need (Diamond – Dybving, 1986; 
Lewis, 1992). Holmström and Tirole (1998) argue that 
a key function of a financial intermediary is to provide 
liquidity in the form of loan commitments. Kashyap et 
al. (2002) also emphasize that banks provide liquidity 
through loan commitments or credit lines. Loan com-
mitments can give a borrower the option to draw down 
their loan amount on demand during the period of the 
contract. These withdrawals are uncertain to the bank. 
From the perspectives of customers, loan commitments 
provide liquidity, like demand deposits, whenever they 
require liquidity unexpectedly.
Traditionally, the transformation service of creating 
liquidity is to be provided almost exclusively by banks, 
and, consequently, particularly importance has been at to 
preserve the ability of banks to create liquidity. Depos-
it insurance is considered the most effective measure to 
prevent runs without preventing banks from creating li-
quidity, and, consequently, bank policy issues should be 
considered in the context of deposit insurance (Diamond – 
Dybving, 1986). It has been shown that deposit insurance 
enables banks to meet increased credit demand and syn-
chronized draw-downs during episodes of market stress 
(Gatev – Strahan, 2006).
Liquidity provision, especially providing credit and 
payment services in the area most affected by Fintech 
competition. This area has attracted the most investment 
and companies to experiment and offer new technologies 
and type of services. Many firms are attempting to create 
their proprietary payment platforms or to compete in the 
provision of access to established payment systems with 
new technology or infrastructure. At the same time, al-
ternative lending players are offering non-bank credit to 
different actors of the economy. 
As Aaron et al. (2017) have highlighted, an import-
ant implication of the competition from Fintech players 
in the liquidity provision is that banks could reduce the 
amount of bank deposits and their credit to the economy. 
However, the likelihood will depend on the rate of adop-
tion of the alternative means of liquidity and the reaction 
and response of banks. The rate of adoption of newer and 
more advanced technologies may be delayed by the no-
tion that new form of liquidity provision platform require 
acceptance by both customers and merchants, a problem 
that has received attention in the literature (Camere et al., 
2016; Arifovic et al., 2017).
Banks as asset transformers
Banks not only provide liquidity but they are doing it by 
transforming the different assets in their balance sheet. 
By grating loans and collecting deposits, banks provide 
the transformation of maturity, liquidity, and risk between 
their assets and liabilities. They simultaneously grant both 
borrowers with permanent or long-term capital and lend-
ers with liquidity deposit for their asset holdings, deposit 
that liquid enough to be turned into cash at short notice. 
To manage this conflicting demand of lenders and borrow-
ers, financial intermediaries such as banks transform the 
cash flow of firms into a form that lenders find desirable 
(Gurley – Shaw, 1960; Gorton – Pennacchi, 1990; Casu – 
Girardone, 2006; Tirole et al., 2010).
Financial intermediaries also address the risks associ-
ated with maturity transformation by diversifying funding 
sources. Risk associated with transformation of default 
risk can be reduced by obtaining information on poten-
tial borrowers and selecting those that have the highest 
repayment potentials. In this regard, Buckle and Thomp-
son (2004) point out that banks have advantage over direct 
lender in obtaining useful information on potential bor-
rowers since most of these borrowers use banks’ payment 
services.
Through their asset transformation activity banks also 
decrease transaction costs of channeling funds between 
borrowers and lenders, leading to a more efficient alloca-
tion of resources.
An important implication of Fintech advancement is 
the peer-to-peer lending models and the emergence of 
marketplace lending players. The core objective of these 
lending platforms is to channel savings from individuals 
and investors directly to borrowers, hence reducing the 
costs of intermediation (Yum et al., 2012; Balyuk, 2016). 
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The fourth chapter of the paper discusses this role of mar-
ketplace lending players more broadly.
Banks as information monitories
The information monitoring and provision function of 
financial intermediaries is broadly discussed in the lit-
erature on information asymmetry, especially in cases 
when moral hazard and adverse selection problems are 
addressed. 
In general, the role of banks can also be explained by 
their ‘agent’ function. As Jaffee and Russell (1976) and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue banks have been the insti-
tutional solution to the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion in the credit market between lenders and borrowers. 
Banks process information and monitor borrowers using 
specialized technologies. They act as delegated monitors 
and ensure that firms use the resources allocated to them 
and are able to mitigate asymmetric information resulting 
in adverse selection and moral hazard by screening and 
monitoring borrowers at reduced cost versus individual 
lenders (Diamond, 1984; Allen – Carletti, 2010). 
Banks also have comparative advantage to other finan-
cial intermediaries (such as individual lenders or special-
ized firms, as lending providers) in information production 
because of economies of scale and scope, which reduce the 
cost of informational asymmetries. As a result, diversifica-
tion decreases the cost of delegated monitoring to a finan-
cial intermediary and allows banks to provide monitoring 
service on a lower cost than monitoring done individually 
(Leland – Pyle, 1977; Bhattacharya – Thakor, 1993). In do-
ing so, banks often establish long-term trust-based financial 
relationships with their clients, which may further mitigate 
the negative impacts of adverse selection and moral hazard 
on the resource allocation process (Mayer, 1988).
Furthermore, in the economy the quality of informa-
tion is most cases difficult to collect therefore the dis-
tinction between good and bad information is not readily 
available Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that because of the 
lack of adequate information on quality, the price of in-
formation in general will reflect average quality. This will 
also result in a higher-than-average cost of searching for 
high-quality information. They argue that in the financial 
market these problems can be resolved by a bank which 
uses information to buy and hold assets in its portfolio. 
In this way, information becomes a private good and not 
transferable, thus providing an incentive to gather infor-
mation.
Technology has significantly reshaping the informa-
tion monitoring role of financial intermediaries. Many 
Fintech firms are active in information processing, ex-
ploiting the amount of information available. These busi-
ness models usually exploit technology like big data and 
machine learning. New technologies have brought signif-
icant changes in methods to collect, present, and evaluate 
information. Search costs for credit information have been 
reduced, and the collection of credit assessment data has 
transformed covering much wider set of data. This has led 
to the potential decrease of asymmetric information prob-
lem in banking (Yan et al., 2015; He et al., 2017).
The advantage of banks in financial 
intermediation versus other financial 
institutions
The question arises whether non-bank financial and 
non-financial institutions can replace banks in their role of 
financial intermediation. While some does not distinguish 
the role of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries 
(Allen – Santomero, 1997), others highlight the unique-
ness of banks versus others (Bhattacharya – Thakor, 1993; 
Rajan, 1996; Kashyap et al., 2002; Aaron et al., 2017). 
Banks have been considered to have important advantages 
over other financial institutions and non-bank market par-
ticipants in providing various forms of liquidity services. 
This section aims to summarize the key arguments why 
banks have certain advantage compared to other market 
participants in the financial intermediation. 
First, banks are the sole financial intermediaries who 
can offer the public with liquidity and payment services 
both through their deposit-taking and lending business. 
Rajan (1996) and Kashyap et al. (2002) emphasize banks’ 
advantageous role in liquidity provision versus other fi-
nancial intermediaries. They argue that the two core bank-
ing activities – taking in deposits on demand and originat-
ing loans – should be performed by financial institutions 
as both activities require an institution to come up with 
cash at short notice. Banks’ advantage comes from the 
notion that by offering these services jointly banks can re-
solve the liquidity management problem that arises when 
loan commitments are drown down and immediacy is de-
manded on deposits. Both services require banks to hold 
balances of liquid assets to provide liquidity on demand to 
depositors as well as to credit line borrowers. Banks lever-
ages synergy as they combine deposit-taking with loan 
commitments. They argue that banks have an advantage 
in providing liquidity because deposit withdrawals and 
loan commitment drawdowns are not highly correlated. 
Second, scale and scope economics argument also re-
quires that the two activities should be performed by the 
same institutions (Rajan, 1996; Walter, 2003; Aaron et 
al., 2017). Sources of scale and scope economies include 
information- technology related economies, risk transfor-
mation advantage, reputation and marketing related ben-
efits, innovation related economies, and diversification 
benefits (Beck, 2001; Walter, 2003).
While new market entrants often scale up rapidly at 
lower cost than traditional players, exploring the advan-
tages of scale and scope economies will determine the 
ability of banks to defend their competitive position from 
Fintech entrants (Boot, 2016). This is especially true for 
the risk transformation activity of banks. By pooling large 
funds, financial intermediaries reduce the risk of an in-
vestment to the investor. A financial intermediary needs 
a large fund of deposits and loans to reduce the risk of 
one particular single customer. By giving their customers 
products with stable distributions of cash-flows, financial 
intermediaries can reduce the costs of an investment for 
their customers (Allen – Santomero, 1997). The function 
of financial intermediaries as risk-pooling institutions is 
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especially important in market segments with illiquid as-
sets or long-term maturities. In these segments, the risk 
and the standard deviation of the returns on investment are 
very high. It requires high risk premium and a large pool 
of funds to compensate for this risk (Beck, 2001). 
Third, as highlighted earlier, scale economics argu-
ment also applies for the information monitoring activity 
of banks.  As argued by Leland and Pyle (1977) financial 
intermediaries can be seen as information sharing coali-
tions. Diamond (1984) later highlighted that these coali-
tions can achieve economies of scale by claiming that in-
termediaries who perform the monitoring are diversifying 
their portfolio and are bigger which allows them to finance 
a large number of debtors. Considering that diversification 
leads to the increase of the number of bank credits, the 
financial intermediaries of larger sizes is generating scale 
economies in the monitoring process as well. 
Fintech challenge for banks – 
Disintermediation on both side of the 
balance sheet?
By the technological advancement, other financial and 
non-financial institutions besides banks became capable 
to provide financial services to the public. One may ar-
gue that the reduction of transaction costs caused by the 
internet have reduce the barriers to enter the market and 
eliminates some of the information asymmetries for finan-
cial intermediation and creates opportunity for new type 
of financial intermediaries and business models to emerge 
disintermediate some of the activities and function of tra-
ditional banks. Competition from non-bank players due to 
the internet is especially relevant for products which are 
standardized and have a low risk. 
Although several Fintech players claim to challenge 
banks, there are two business models that gained share so 
far: online marketplace lenders aiming to disintermediate 
traditional banks in credit process and neo-banks provid-
ing deposit services for customers in a low-cost operating 
model. 
The question, however, if these new players on the 
market are able to compete with banks and potentially 
replace or are they rather complementary to the existing 
financial intermediation activity of traditional banks. 
While the role of online marketplace lenders in the finan-
cial intermediation have been addressed by academia (see 
Yum et al., 2012; Kirby – Worner, 2014; Mills – McCar-
thy, 2014; Morse, 2015; Milne – Parboteeah, 2016; Balyuk, 
2016; Hopstaken et al., 2016), neo-banks and their role and 
relationship with traditional financial institutions has not 
yet been addressed. 
Online marketplace lending
Marketplace lending is a newly emerging segment of the 
financial services industry that leverages investment cap-
ital and operates data- and technology-driven online plat-
forms to lend either directly or indirectly to retail consum-
ers and small businesses. The segment initially emerged 
as a peer-to-peer lending, with companies giving consum-
ers and individual investors the ability and the platform to 
find investment opportunities and provide financing to in-
dividual borrowers. As products and business models have 
evolved, the investor base for online marketplace lenders 
has expanded and today includes institutional investors, 
hedge fund, and financial institutions besides individual 
investors. In recognition of this shift in investor base, the 
market as a whole has evolved beyond a pure peer-to-peer 
model (Kirby – Worner, 2014; Mills – McCarthy, 2014).
The history of the online marketplace lending has 
begun in the United Kingdom with the lunch of Zopa in 
2005. Since the launch of the platform, the market has 
experienced a significant global growth. Many platforms 
have been launched both in developed and developing 
countries, however countries show a different market evo-
lution depending on their regulatory and market environ-
ment. (Table 1.)
Exhibit 1
Evolution of online marketplace lending globally
2013 2014 2015
Middle East  
and Africa billion USD 0.08 0.15 0.24
Europe billion USD 1.13 2.83 5.43
Americas billion USD 4.46 11.70 28.70
Asia billion USD 5.56 23.30 103.31
(Wardrop, et al., 2016) (Zhang, et al., 2017) (Zhang, et al., 2016) 
(Gravery, et al., 2017) (Ziegler, et al., 1017)
In Europe, United Kingdom is the most developed market 
in terms of online marketplace. By the end of 2015, the 
size of market reached USD 4.41 billion, accounting for 
81% of the total European market (Zhang et al., 2016).
In the United States, it is estimated that marketplace 
lenders accounted for loan originations worth approxi-
mately USD 28.28 billion in 2015 with almost 16 million 
consumer having loans with alternative lending players in 
the USA (Ziegler et al., 1017; Wolf, 2017). 
China’s online marketplace lending sector has under-
gone an extremely rapid growth since the first platform 
gone live in 2007. The launch of PPDAI, the first online 
lending platform was followed by the emergence of sever-
al major platforms, including Hongling Capital, Renrendai 
and Lufax. The industry as a whole entered the “fast lane” 
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and developed rapidly, with multifold increases across all 
main indicators such as the number of investors, borrow-
ers, platforms and business turnover. While there is yet no 
verifiable industry-wide data on the volume of online mar-
ketplace lending in China, it is estimated that marketplace 
lending volume reached USD 102.19 million in 2015 with 
2,595 online marketplace lenders on the market (Gravery 
et al., 2017; Morgan Stanley, 2015).
When it comes to the online marketplace lending play-
ers, the largest lender is Lending Club operating in the 
United States, which has granted loans of over USD 22 
billion since its launch in 2011. Lending Club is operat-
ed by note-based business model for consumers. This is 
the most commonly used business model in the sector. 
To apply for credit, credit applicants need to register their 
credit needs and personal information on the Lending 
Club website. Lending Club assesses the credit applicant’s 
creditworthiness and determines the applicant’s risk rat-
ing using its proprietary credit rating system. Credit ap-
plicants are classified to different groups on their expected 
repayment risk. The interest rate applied is determined 
based on the risk classification of the applicant. Investors 
of Lending Club can choose which loan they wish to invest 
in, based on the information provided by the applicant, the 
size and risk rating of the loans. While the interest payable 
by the credit applicant cannot be influenced by the inves-
tors, they can decide what portion of the loan they wish to 
finance. When the full amount of the loan is collected, a 
designated bank grants the loan and sells a note to Lend-
ing Club at the amount of the loan. Lending Club then re-
sells this note to its investors. Lending Club does not take 
any responsibility for repaying the loan, as the obligor of 
the note is the borrower. In the case of a potential default, 
the risk is borne by the investor. 
Lending Club and the other online marketplace lend-
ers compete with traditional banks in costs and services. 
Thanks to full-scale operation and the regulatory arbitrage 
resulting from indirect lending, they can operate with op-
erating costs 300–400 basis points lower than traditional 
banks. Hence even Lending Club, one of the largest and 
longest-established players on the market, has been in the 
red since its launch in 2011, which justifiably calls into 
question the sustainability of the business model (Lend-
ingClub, 2016; Molnar – Adam, 2017).
Online marketplace lending platforms offer a new 
form of intermediation by enabling the direct matching of 
lenders and borrowers. Albeit in early stage, online mar-
ketplace lenders have developed various business models, 
with one common characteristic: the platform only act an 
indirect intermediary between the funding source and the 
borrower. As a result, they do not take traditional credit 
risks and therefore are subject of fewer regulations than 
traditional financial credit provision institutions. This op-
erating model allows them to operate with more capital 
efficiency and lower operating costs (Hopstaken et al., 
2016). 
Online marketplace lenders typically differ from each 
other according to the product type and their business 
model applied. Online marketplace lenders usually pro-
vide a limited number of product types or show prevailing 
attention to a specific market segment. They are usually 
focusing on the less complex loan products, such as per-
sonal loans (e.g., Zopa, Prosper, Lending Club), student 
loans (e.g., SoFi), small business lending (e.g., First Cir-
cle, Kabbage), invoice discounting (e.g., The Receivables 
Exchange, Market Invoice), foreign exchange transactions 
(e.g., Currency Cloud, Currency Fair, Transferwise), real 
estate financing (e.g., Lending Home, Reality Mogul).
As commonly argued, online marketplace lenders 
bring innovation to credit disintermediation on two fronts. 
One is the launch of online platforms that allow matching 
borrowers and lenders directly. These platforms allow in-
dividual borrowers to request a loan online, and lenders to 
screen loan applications and decide how much to lend. Al-
though the business model of indirect lending has already 
existed before, online marketplace lenders have created a 
public market for consumer debt, creating more transpar-
ency around demand and supply. A second technological 
innovation is the use of fully-automated algorithms to 
price and underwrite loans to lower screening and trans-
action costs.
Some argue that online marketplace lending plat-
forms can disintermediate banks in the provision of credit 
(Morse, 2015; Balyuk, 2016). This is stemming from the 
notion that these online platforms adhere some of the ac-
tivities of traditional financial intermediaries. Similar to 
banks, they are able to act as delegated monitors and to 
mitigate asymmetric information on the market. They 
are not just monitoring information, but claim to better 
reduce financing frictions in the consumer credit market 
than banks because information streams through sever-
al lending relationships. Given the marketplace lending 
credit process described above, these platforms can im-
prove information as they are leveraging information from 
a divers set of institutional lenders, lenders that use differ-
ent proprietary credit risk screening method. As Allen and 
Gale (1999) highlighted, public markets can be superior 
to financial intermediaries in providing funding because 
diversity of opinion is valuable when information is in-
expensive. This may apply to online marketplace lenders 
as well. The combined information screening of different 
investors may mitigate asymmetric information problem 
by leveraging the wisdom of the crowd especially in cus-
tomer segments where signals on creditworthiness of new 
borrowers are very limited (Yum et al., 2012; Balyuk, 
2016). 
This paper argues, however, that despite their role to 
mitigate information, the alternative models of online 
marketplace lending are rather complementary to, and 
not competitive with the traditional credit provision of fi-
nancial institutions. There are three main reasons for that. 
First, online marketplace lending platforms may, in some 
extent, disintermediate banks in credit provision, but they 
cannot compete with banks in the provision of liquidity 
services. By offering deposit, payment and lending ser-
vices jointly, banks can provide liquidity services to cus-
tomers who are uncertain about the timing of their future 
consumption need. As such, banks are pooling liquidity 
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that provide customers with insurance against idiosyn-
cratic shocks that affect their consumption needs. Hence, 
customers can draw deposits on demand and have flexi-
bility in their use of loan facilities. Customers are willing 
to accept lower rates of return on deposits higher costs 
of borrowing in return for these liquidity services. While 
some of the online marketplace lending platforms are 
offering liquidity services, the scope of these services is 
limited, mostly because they do not have access to central 
bank liquidity (Milne – Parboteeah, 2016). 
Second, unlike banks, online marketplace lending plat-
forms do not engage in maturity transformation. In theo-
ry, platforms do not allow investors to provide investment 
with a shorter maturity than the maturity of the credit re-
financed. As an effect, online marketplace lenders are un-
able to intermediate between borrowers and investors with 
heterogeneous preferences. An alarming trend, however, 
that online marketplace lending platforms are more often 
allow maturity mismatch, and enable lenders to withdraw 
money more quickly than borrowers are required to repay 
loans. As Lord Adair Turner, former head of the Financial 
Services Authority in the United Kingdom, warned online 
marketplace lending may be the source of high systemic 
risk if the initial, simple peer-to-peer lending model is al-
tered allowing complex product, long and complex distri-
bution chains in which the same securities passed through 
multiple different links, and if securities with long under-
lying maturity can be re-financed by positions using short-
term money market borrowing (Turner, 2016).  
Finally, loans provided by the online marketplace lend-
er platforms are rather supplementary to bank loan in the 
high-risk borrower segments. Researches from countries 
with developed online marketplace lending sector have ad-
dressed this question. In Germany De Roure et al. (2016) 
and Blaseg and Koetter (2015) have found that previously 
neglected segments of the consumer credit market, such 
as high-risk consumers and those applying for small credit 
lines, as well as businesses facing lack of credit by banks 
are the potential borrowers of the new online marketplace 
lending platforms. Chaffee and Rapp (2012) have found in 
the U.S. that this form of lending has brought funding to 
individuals “that were underserved by the credit markets 
even prior to the retraction of those markets in 2008”.
Neo-banks
The proliferation of internet services and the growing 
adoption of online and mobile channels among customers 
have fueled the entrance of new type of banks in the finan-
cial sector. The common characteristics of these compa-
nies that they adopted an internet-only strategy having lit-
tle or even no branch system and relying on other, usually 
non-physical networks – mainly internet and mobile – to 
meet the majority of customers’ transaction and financial 
service needs. 
Hence, traditional banks are also embracing inter-
net-focused strategy, some of the new intermediaries 
entering the financial sector, the so called neo-banks are 
adopting a fundamentally different operating model. Neo-
banks have started to operate in developed countries, es-
pecially in United Kingdom and USA in the last couple of 
years. Neo-banks offer purely internet-based services for 
customers and putting accessibility in the heart of their 
service offering. They are called ‘banks’ as they synthe-
size the offering of traditional consumer bank products, 
such as current account, saving accounts, payment ser-
vices and occasionally credit products. On the operations 
side, however, neo-banks appear to be very different from 
banks. 
A key aspect of their operation is the absence bank 
license and partnership with other financial institutions. 
As these players have no bank license, they provide their 
financial products in partnership with one or several li-
censed financial institutions that provide back office, core 
banking, compliance, transaction processing, fraud and 
risk management along with the ‘white-label’ product. 
Neo-banks usually deliver only the services and not the 
products1, receives fee income from customers and pays 
subscription fee for the partner banks. 
As of today, neo-banks have a narrow range of prod-
uct offerings with two different models evolving: One, the 
solely deposit and payment model where deposits are held 
by one partner bank (examples include Monese and Osper 
in the United Kingdom or Simple in the United States). 
Second, some of neo-banks offer both deposit, payment 
and credit products. In this case, the two products are un-
der the management of different partner institutions (who 
are responsible for the credit assessment and underwrit-
ing) or the credit product is issued by the neo-bank itself 
that owes consumer credit license. Although neo-banks 
are new phenomena in financial intermediation, some of 
the players have already altered their business model and 
moved from the indirect intermediation model to direct 
intermediation by being granted of a banking license. 
The core innovation of the neo-bank business model is 
that it removes risk and lowers regulatory requirements as 
it usually does not offer credit directly to customers. The 
indirect product model also simplifies operations through 
the lack of complex IT infrastructure and bureaucratic 
overhead. The lower operating costs allows these busi-
nesses to pass rent benefits to customer and as an effect, 
allows a lower price for services. Neo-banks are a com-
pletely new type of non-bank financial intermediaries, as 
they are gathering deposit – although indirectly – without 
former banking license. 
One of the first neo-bank launched in Europe was the 
Germany-based N26 (previously known as Number26). It 
was initially launched in a neo-bank business model offer-
ing current account, payment and investment management 
for its customers. N26 have no physical branches, custom-
er can manage all their banking products and services on 
an online or mobile platform. When launched N26 has no 
products, but operated in partnership with other financial 
institutions to offer all its services. Its deposit product was 
offered in partnership with Wirecard Bank, a bank with 
full-banking license. All N26 accounts was opened and 
held by Wirecard Bank and was responsible for fulfill-
1  One exception is Varo that offers deposit products managed by US 
Bancorp and gained lending. 
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ment of all legal and regulatory requirements. N26 part-
nered with Transferwise, a peer-to-peer payment provider 
company to allow N26's customers transferring money 
overseas, as well as Vaamo, a German online investment 
management and robo-advisory company to allow N26 
customer to invest into simple investment products. In 
July 2016 N26 received a banking license in Germany that 
changed indirect business model for bank to a direct mod-
el (N26, 2017).
Despite the internet-based business models, neo-banks 
have not reached significant customer number yet. Table 
2. highlights the customer numbers of some of the largest 
neo-banks. 
Exhibit 2
Launch year and customer numbers of neo-banks
Launch year Customer number
Atom Bank 2016 17,000
Monzo 2015 200,000
N26 2015 500,000
Revolut 2015 1,000,000
Tandem 2015 100,000
The question this paper is addressing whether financial 
intermediation literature can explain the emergence and 
offer rational for the existence of these new type of non-
bank financial intermediaries. Although there are some 
arguments that neo-banks are able to disintermediate the 
traditional banking model in some respects, the main ar-
gument of this paper is that neo-banks in theory are not 
substitutes of banks and can enhance the financial inter-
mediation only under a few conditions. 
Neo-banks aim in general is to embrace the technolo-
gy-driven behavioral shifts and provide technology-driv-
en banking services. Hence, the volume and market share 
that neo-banks have commanded so far in terms of cus-
tomer numbers is small and as highlighted above, their 
offering is founded on basic services, mainly current 
and savings accounts. Nonetheless, their needs-oriented 
approach to customers, especially millennials, and their 
originality makes them worth consideration as potential 
competitors for the established banks. 
First, in general, white-label intermediation model can 
create value and result in a more effective financial inter-
mediation if the intermediary between the consumers and 
the product provider can lower transaction cost or monitor 
borrowers more effectively. In the neo-bank business mod-
el, neo-banks act as additional intermediaries for liquidity 
provisioning and monitoring between the bank and the 
borrowers. As asymmetric information problems in finan-
cial business requires an intermediary with a good repu-
tation, neo-banks can improve intermediation efficiency 
only if they have good reputation or better expertise than 
traditional banks. Neo-banks value proposition is that they 
are able operate with an innovation agility that traditional 
banks are unable to provide, have a better understanding 
of today’s technologies and are able to focus on narrow 
solutions to the exact needs of the customers. Therefore, 
they can act as a supplement to traditional banks to ensure 
early reaction to the changing customer behavior driven 
by technological change. 
Second, it can be argued that neo-banks by leveraging 
internet-based business mode can significantly reduce the 
transaction cost. It is true that the most important single 
feature of the internet and business models embracing 
online and mobile technologies is the reduction of trans-
action costs. This will lead to enlarged markets and to an 
extended division of labor. As argued by Niehans (1983) 
in his paper on transaction cost innovation theory, the 
dominant factor of financial innovation is the reduction 
of transaction cost, and financial innovation is often the 
reaction to the advancement of technology which caused 
the transaction costs to decline. In the recent years, the 
reduction of communication costs significantly helped fi-
nancial intermediaries to reach new markets and custom-
ers without building up an expensive network of branch-
es (Corrocher, 2002; Chang, 2003; Sabi, 2014). However, 
transaction cost reduction of financial intermediation has 
been also been embraced by traditional banks as well, 
who introduced several online and mobile banking ser-
vices for customers both in the developed and developing 
countries. Therefore, the reduction in transaction costs 
as an argument alone may not justify the existence of 
neo-banks. 
Third, the delegated monitoring argument only holds 
for lending, an activity that only a few neo-banks are do-
ing, if neo-banks can monitor borrowers more effectively 
and the cost of monitoring is higher than the rent paid by 
the depository bank to the neo-bank. But neo-banks, as 
newly launched startups, assumed to have neither better 
reputation, nor better expertise than banks. 
Fourth, as neo-banks usually provide only deposit 
products to customers, they cannot compete with tradi-
tional, full-service banks in liquidity provision and asset 
transformation. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the neo-
bank business model requires the stringent oversight of 
regulatory bodies. Even though these players are not li-
cenced banking player, they can affect the financial sta-
bility. It is stemming from the notion that there is moral 
hazard issue if information monitoring mechanism is not 
mutual. Since neo-banks have no capital and customer de-
posits are insured by another institution they can be incen-
tivized in risk-increasing strategies.
Despite claiming to act as a competitor for banks in fi-
nancial intermediation, with their current business model, 
neo-banks are no competition, but rather a complemen-
tation to the role of banks in financial intermediation by 
reducing the transaction costs to deliver deposits. Their 
long-term existence is only justified if they can maintain 
the transaction cost advantage. However, recent improve-
ments in information technology makes the acquisition of 
information easier for every actor, including banks and 
that can question the long-term sustainability of this busi-
ness model. 
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Conclusion
This paper discussed the role of new entrants in the finan-
cial market in the context of the financial intermediation 
literature. It focused on two particular segments of the 
Fintech sector: online marketplace lenders and neo-banks. 
Both segment has experienced significant media attention 
on the last few years. Online marketplace lenders in the 
lending market and neo-banks in the deposit market claim 
that they can superior financial services to customers 
than traditional banks. Their superior value proposition is 
based on the argument that they are able operate with an 
innovation agility that traditional banks are unable to pro-
vide, have a better understanding of today’s technologies 
and are able to laser focus on narrow solutions to the exact 
needs of the customers.
The paper reviewed the role of these new players of 
the financial market in the context of the financial inter-
mediation. By reviewing the literature on financial inter-
mediation theory, the three main functions of banks in the 
financial intermediation of banking services have been in-
troduced: provide funding liquidity, transform assets, and 
ameliorate the information problem between investors and 
borrowers. By introducing the core literature around these 
functions, the paper also highlighted what makes banks 
‘special’ versus other financial intermediaries.
This paper argued that neither the online marketplace 
lending model, nor the neo-bank model are competitive, 
but rather supplementary to traditional banks. In case of 
online marketplace lending, although these players might 
be able to better reduce financing frictions in the credit 
market, but they cannot compete with banks in the provi-
sion of liquidity services and in asset transformation. Neo-
banks role can also be explained a complementary versus 
competitive market position in the context of financial in-
termediation theory.
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